By Tisaranee Gunasekara
“For both Prabhakaran’s war of national liberation and Rajapaksa’s war for national sovereignty, one unstated motive assumed the greatest significance – the entrenchment of unchallenged personal power”.
UTHR-J (Special Report No 34 – 13.12.2009)
Sri Lanka is to buy 14 Mi-171 military helicopters from Russia, two+ years after the war was won.
According to Wikipedia, the average unit-cost of a helicopter is US$11.5 million. The helicopters are being supplied “on account of the Russian state credit given to Sri Lanka by Russia in 2010 for purchasing Russian armaments” (ITAR-TASS – 15.8.2011). According to this loan-agreement, signed in February 2010 (by Lankan Ambassador and Rajapaksa-cousin Udayanga Weeratunga), Colombo is to purchase Russian weapons worth US$300 million within 10 years.
Under Vladimir Putin, armaments became a major Russian export, so the deal is in Russia’s interest. But is it beneficial for Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans? The deal was signed, post-war. This is a loan with interest and not a grant. Why exacerbate our already sky-high indebtedness, to buy exorbitant-weapons after the war has been won?
UTHR-J (Special Report No 34 – 13.12.2009)
Sri Lanka is to buy 14 Mi-171 military helicopters from Russia, two+ years after the war was won.
According to Wikipedia, the average unit-cost of a helicopter is US$11.5 million. The helicopters are being supplied “on account of the Russian state credit given to Sri Lanka by Russia in 2010 for purchasing Russian armaments” (ITAR-TASS – 15.8.2011). According to this loan-agreement, signed in February 2010 (by Lankan Ambassador and Rajapaksa-cousin Udayanga Weeratunga), Colombo is to purchase Russian weapons worth US$300 million within 10 years.
Under Vladimir Putin, armaments became a major Russian export, so the deal is in Russia’s interest. But is it beneficial for Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans? The deal was signed, post-war. This is a loan with interest and not a grant. Why exacerbate our already sky-high indebtedness, to buy exorbitant-weapons after the war has been won?
Who or what is the regime arming itself against? The Tigers are dead. Sri Lanka faces no external military-threat. Is this weapon buying-spree a way for the powers-that-be to make mega-bucks? Or is the regime preparing for the day it will have to defend itself against an Egyptian-type popular revolt?
Last week, Minister G. L. Peiris accused the Tamil Diaspora of launching an “economic onslaught against Sri Lanka to prevent and derail it from gaining economic prosperity” (Daily Mirror – 18.8.2011). The Minister should have pointed the finger inwards. The real obstructions to development are the Rajapaksas’ policy of exorbitant defence costs, post-war, the Rajapaksa proclivity for waste (Rs. 31 million on propaganda for ‘Api Wawamu’) and the Rajapaksa tolerance of official-corruption.
No sooner than the adulterated-petrol scandal subsided, an adulterated-cement crisis erupted. The latter is of far greater consequence, since builders are warning about a consequent debasement of construction-quality. Senior SLFP leader Minister Maitripala Sirisena recently sounded a warning about “the widespread corruption in the construction of highways” (The Sunday Times – 14.8.2011). Interestingly, President Rajapaksa is the Minister of Highways; and the warning was made at a top-level meeting chaired by Presidential-sibling Minister Basil Rajapaksa.
Suicidal Maximalism
The excessive defence costs stem, in part, from the Rajapaksa policy of peace-at-gun-point. The North is under de-facto military occupation, maintained at enormous politico-economic cost.
The only way out is to concede a degree of autonomy to the Tamils, ideally along Indian lines.
The only way out is to concede a degree of autonomy to the Tamils, ideally along Indian lines.